Site MenuUnderstanding Foreign Interference
Election interference, foreign or domestic, is a serious matter, and addressing it comes with specific and complex challenges. However, Canadians should know there are safeguards in the electoral process to mitigate these threats. They should also be aware that everyone involved in elections can be targeted, and we all have a role to play in securing elections. Agencies such as CSE and CSIS have produced reports about the threats to Canada's democratic process. CSE has assessed it is unlikely that sensitive information held by Elections Canada will be compromised by cyber threat actors and unlikely that cyber activity will disrupt voting infrastructure in a national election.
The expression "foreign interference" refers to actions and behaviours that go far beyond the realm of election administration. When interference does affect the administration of elections, the impacts are similar to those found in other subsets of election interference, including domestic interference.
Security agencies also monitor, deter and investigate foreign interference. If they detect potential violations of the Canada Elections Act, they inform the Commissioner of Canada Elections of them. They only share with Elections Canada information that is relevant to our administration of elections.
Visit our Election Integrity and Security page for more in-depth information on the measures in place to protect Canada's electoral system.
There are few aspects of the Canada Elections Act that can fall under the umbrella of foreign interference.The Act prohibits the involvement in specific ways of a foreign individual and entity in our elections. Such prohibition has mostly to do with the political financing regime:
- Only Canadians and permanent residents can make financial contributions
- Foreign individuals or entities cannot register as third parties
- Third parties cannot use foreign funds
The Act includes rules—such as a ban on making contributions using funds from someone else and cash contributions of $20 or more—to prevent circumventing the political financing regime.
The Act also prohibits undue influence by foreigners, meaning that no person or entity can unduly influence a voter to vote or refrain from voting, or to vote or refrain from voting for a particular candidate or registered party, at the election. Potential violations of the Canada Elections Act are reviewed by the Commissioner of Canada elections.
The table below provides an overview of the ways that non-Canadians are permitted, under the Canada Elections Act, to participate in federal elections. This information is not exhaustive and does not replace the provisions of the Canada Elections Act or the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
| Canadian citizen | Permanent resident note 2 | Individual who is neither a Canadian citizen nor a permanent resident note 1 | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Residing in Canada | Residing outside Canada | Residing in Canada | Residing outside Canada | ||
| Voting in a federal election | Permitted, if at least 18 years old on election day | Permitted, if at least 18 years old on election day and if previously resided in Canada | Not permitted | Not permitted | Not permitted |
| Being a candidate in a federal election | Permitted, if at least 18 years old on election day note 3 | Permitted, if at least 18 years old on election day note 3 | Not permitted | Not permitted | Not permitted |
| Making a contribution to a registered party, an electoral district association, a candidate, a nomination contestant or a leadership contestant | Permitted, within the limits set out in the Canada Elections Act | Permitted, within the limits set out in the Canada Elections Act | Permitted, within the limits set out in the Canada Elections Act | Not permitted | Not permitted |
| Making a contribution to a third party for the purpose of the third party’s regulated activities under the Canada Elections Act | Permitted | Permitted | Permitted | Not permitted note 4 | Not permitted note 4 |
| Being an individual third party or incurring expenses for a third party’s regulated activities under the Canada Elections Act | Permitted, within the limits set out in the Canada Elections Act | Permitted, within the limits set out in the Canada Elections Act | Permitted, within the limits set out in the Canada Elections Act | Permitted, within the limits set out in the Canada Elections Act | Not permitted |
Without incurring any expense regulated by the Canada Elections Act, either
|
Permitted | Permitted | Permitted | Permitted | Permitted |
| Regardless of the expense incurred in doing so, transmitting to the public, through broadcasting or through electronic or print media, an editorial, a debate, a speech, an interview, a column, a letter, a commentary or news note 5 | Permitted | Permitted | Permitted | Permitted | Permitted |
Notes
Return to note 1 Candidate nominations and party leadership races are not included in this table because each party oversees its own races and has its own rules. The table also does not cover the rules in the Canada Elections Act that are specifically directed at groups or corporations.
Return to note 2 As defined in subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
Return to note 3 Some persons are ineligible. See section 65 of the Canada Elections Act for details.
Return to note 4 The Canada Elections Act does not prevent the individual from making a contribution to a third party. However, sections 349.02 and 349.03 of that Act prohibit the third party from using that contribution for its regulated activities, whether directly or indirectly.
Return to note 5 Providing that no contravention of subsection 330(1) or (2) of the Canada Elections Act is involved in the transmission.
It should also be noted that there are mechanisms in the Act to contest an election in an electoral district. In a contested election proceeding, a judge determines whether there were irregularities, fraud, or corrupt or illegal practices that affected the result of the election.
What Elections Canada Is Doing
Elections Canada has a mandate to ensure that Canadians are well-informed about the electoral process. We do this in three ways, as elaborated on below:
Electoral Security
Outreach and Voter Information
- During elections, deliver comprehensive Voter information Campaign to position EC as the authoritative source of information about when, where and the ways to register and vote
- Repository of EC communication products on the EC website
- Work with stakeholders to spread the word and provide correct voter information
Pre-empting, Detection and Response
- Pre-empting and "pre-bunking"
- Detecting inaccurate narratives and assess potential impact
- Respond with accurate information using EC communication channels, reaching out to the source(s), escalating to digital platforms and/or security agencies
- Maintaining and updating Elections Canada's ElectoFacts as a tool for electors to easily check whether information they've seen online about the electoral process is accurate.
Civic Education
- Work with educators and civic society groups to offer education programming to build knowledge, understanding, interest and skills required for future voters and voters to participate in the electoral process
- Promote fact-checking services and encourage vigilance
Since we know that foreign interference can sometimes take the form of false or inaccurate information on the electoral process that is spread on purpose, Elections Canada is exploring more education initiatives in multiple languages to help strengthen the resilience of new Canadians and future electors against such false information, as well as to bolster their overall understanding of the process.
In Meeting New Challenges: Recommendations from the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada following the 43rd and 44th General Elections, which was tabled in June 2022, the CEO also made recommendations to improve the Act that are relevant in the context of foreign interference:
- Recommendation 4.2.1 proposes expanding the rules on undue influence by a foreign individual and entity to the pre-writ period.
- Recommendation 2.3.1 proposes a regime to more effectively prevent the use of foreign funds by third parties.
- Recommendation 8.4.1 proposes to ban the use of untraceable instruments such as prepaid credit cards and to adopt specific rules for contributions in cryptocurrency.
- Recommendation 4.1.1 proposes to prohibit knowingly making false statements about the voting process in order to disrupt the conduct of the election or to undermine the legitimacy of the election or its results.
The CEO could also make more recommendations in the future.